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I.   QUESTION PRESENTED 
 
Does a private consumer of insurance have a cause of action 
against an insurer to recover damages caused by a violation of the UTPA, 
or does the enforcement of the UTPA outside the claims handling process 
lie exclusively with the State Auditor? 
 
II.   FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
Appellant Mark Ibsen, Inc. (Ibsen) brought this claim alleging 
Appellee Caring for Montanans, Inc. (CFM) charged kickbacks on its 
healthcare premiums.1 These kickbacks went to the Montana Chamber of 
Commerce, who promoted CFM health care plans to its members.2 The 
Montana State Auditor3 found this practice violated the Unfair Trade 
Practices Act (UTPA), specifically Mont. Code Ann. §§ 33–18–208 and 
33–18–212, and fined CFM $250,000.4 CFM emphasizes that it gave full 
benefits, charged nothing additional, and that the violation came only from 
the manner in which it itemized on billing statements.5 Ibsen sought class 
certification and argued that consumers, including Ibsen who paid its 
employee’s health care premiums, were entitled to damages for the fees 
charged in violation of the UTPA, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of 
contract, and unjust enrichment.6 The case was removed to federal court 
and then remanded back to state court.7  
The district court dismissed the lawsuit, holding an insurance 
consumer has no cause of action for a violation of the UTPA against an 
insurer outside the claims handling process, because it invades the State 
Auditor’s exclusive power to enforce the insurance code.8 The district 
court held that the tort and contract actions were an attempt to “back door” 
the Auditor’s exclusivity under the UTPA.9 Ibsen appealed, arguing it 
                                           
1 Opening Brief of Appellant at 19, Ibsen v. Caring for Montanan’s Inc. (Mont. Aug. 25, 2015) (DA 
15-0205). 
2 Id. 
3 Commonly referred to as “Commissioner of Securities and Insurance” or “Insurance Commissioner,” 
though the Montana Constitution gives the name “State Auditor,” and attempts to amend the name in 
the Constitution have repeatedly been rejected by the people of Montana. 
4 Opening Brief of Appellant at 9. 
5 Caring for Montanan’s, Inc. Answer Brief at 7, Ibsen v. Caring for Montanan’s Inc. (Mont. Oct. 26, 
2015) (DA 15-0205). 
6 Id. at 1. 
7 Id. 
8 Opening Brief of Appellant at 20. 
9 Id. at 21. 
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should have an action to recover funds wrongfully charged by an insurer.10 
The Montana State Auditor and the Montana Trial Lawyers Association 
(MTLA) also filed Amicus Curie briefs. 
 
III.   SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
 
A.   Appellant Ibsen 
 
Ibsen argues the fine imposed by the Auditor did not compensate 
consumers injured by the scheme.11 It provides three separate theories by 
which an insured could bring a cause of action to recover damages. 
Ibsen first asserts that common law claims can be brought to 
redress violations of the UTPA. It contends that the district court 
wrongfully relied on precedent from federal court to determine there is no 
cause of action in the present case.12 Instead, Ibsen asserts, the court should 
look to Montana case law, which holds common law claims can be brought 
to remedy violations of the Montana insurance statutes.13 Ibsen starts with 
Klaudt v. Flink,14 which held a civil action may be brought and the 
auditor’s action is not the exclusive remedy for an unfair trade practice 
violation.15 After Klaudt, the 1987 Legislature codified the provision at 
issue,16 which limits the cause of action against an insurer in certain 
circumstances. Ibsen argues this provision was only meant to limit the 
causes of actions within the claims handling process and asserts there is 
no legislative history to suggest otherwise.17 Ibsen further argues that since 
the amendment, the Montana Supreme Court has decided three cases 
which indicate private causes of action exist. First is O’Fallon v. Farmers 
Insurance Exchange,18 where the court held that common law actions to 
redress violations of the UTPA are only barred under the new amendment 
when they deal with the claims handling process.19 Second is Thomas v. 
Northwestern National Ins. Co.,20 where the Court allowed a common law 
claim regarding the renewal of a policy, which did not deal with the claims 
handling process.21 The court also noted that the “Legislature did not 
intend the Unfair Trade Practices Act to be the exclusive remedy in 
litigation instituted by insureds against their insurers.”22 Third is Williams 
                                           
10 Id. at 10. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 21. 
13 Opening Brief of Appellant at 21. 
14 Klaudt v. Flink, 658 P.2d 1065 (Mont. 1983). 
15 Id. at 1066–67. 
16 MONT. CODE ANN. § 33–18–242. 
17 Opening Brief of Appellant at 23. 
18 O’Fallon v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 859 P.2d 1008 (Mont. 1993). 
19 Id. at 1014–15. 
20 Thomas v. Northwestern National Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 804 (Mont. 1998). 
21 Id. at 809. 
22 Id. 
2016 PRECAP: IBSEN V. CARING FOR MONTANANS 11 
v. Union Fidelity Life Ins. Co.,23 which allowed an insured to bring claims 
for fraud and bad faith against an insurer when the action did not deal with 
the handling of a claim.24 Ibsen argues that O’Fallon, Thomas and 
Williams allow for a cause of action for a violation of the UTPA. 
Ibsen next asserts that even if there is no cause of action for a 
violation of the UTPA, insureds have a cause of action for breach of 
contract.25 Ibsen relies on Sagan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America,26 which 
held that insurance statutes are assumed to be part of an insurance 
contract.27 Ibsen notes that Utah recognizes a breach of contract claim for 
the violation of an insurance statute.28  
Finally, Ibsen asserts that its claim for breach of fiduciary duty 
and unjust enrichment should not be precluded only because the conduct 
violated the insurance code and that these claims exist independently of 
the UTPA.29  
 
B.   Appellee Caring for Montanans 
 
CFM supports the district court’s conclusion that there is no 
private right of action for a violation of the UTPA. At the outset, CFM 
notes that Ibsen is not an insured because Ibsen purchased coverage for its 
employees and is not a participant or beneficiary of a plan.30  
CFM argues there is no private cause of action for a violation of 
the UTPA. It starts with the legislative history. The 1959 Legislature 
enacted the UTPA based on a model act.31 In 1977, the Commissioner was 
granted greater enforcement powers by the legislature.32 In 1983, the Court 
decided Klaudt, which CFM asserts is much more narrow than Ibsen 
contends. CFM argues that Klaudt only created a cause of action for a third 
part claimant to sue a tortfeasor’s insurer for mishandling the claims 
process.33 CFM argues that Klaudt did not allow a private cause of action 
for any violation of the UTPA.34 CFM asserts the 1987 amendment to the 
UTPA was in response to Klaudt, to codify limits on private causes of 
actions and increase the enforcement powers of the Auditor.35 CFM points 
to legislative history which suggests the purpose of this amendment was 
to have potential plaintiffs complain to the Auditor instead of sue the 
                                           
23 Williams v. Union Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 123 P.3d 213 (Mont. 2005). 
24 Id. at 222–23. 
25 Opening Brief of Appellant at 28. 
26 Sagan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 857 P.2d 719 (Mont. 1993). 
27 Id. at 721. 
28 Opening Brief of Appellant at 29. 
29 Id. at 30. 
30 Caring for Montanan’s, Inc. Answer Brief at 7. 
31 See Robert Williams, Montana’s Comprehensive New Insurance Law, 22 Mont. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1960). 
32 Caring for Montanan’s, Inc. Answer Brief at 8–9. 
33 Id. at 9–10. 
34 Id. at 10. 
35 Id. 
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insurer.36 CFM further argues that the model act has the intent of 
prohibiting private causes of action, especially class action suits.37 CFM 
asserts that California, Connecticut and Wyoming have all held there is no 
private cause of action under similar UTPA provisions.38  
CFM next addresses statutory construction. It quotes Faust v. Util. 
Solutions, LLC,39 which opines there are four factors to consider when 
deciding if a statute creates a private right of action: (1) consistency within 
the statute; (2) the intent of the legislature, given the statutes plain 
language; (3) avoiding “absurd” results; and (4) the construction of the 
statutes by the agency charged with its administration.40 CFM argues that 
the UTPA enforcement is left to the Auditor with the exception of the 
claims handling process; that the legislature rightfully intended the 
enforcement of the UTPA lay with the Auditor and not the courts; any 
reference to a common law cause of action is out of context; and the 
Auditor’s current interpretation is contrary to the Auditor’s position in the 
1987 legislature, which wanted to avoid compensatory schemes for 
violations of the UTPA.41  
Next, CFM tackles the case law. It first points to the federal cases 
of Shupak v New York Life Ins. Co.,42 and, most recently, Fossen v. Caring 
for Montanans,43 affirmed in the Ninth Circuit,44 which both held the State 
Auditor is the sole enforcer of the UTPA, not courts through private causes 
of action. CFM argues these federal courts have already made well-
reasoned decisions based on the plain language of the statute, legislative 
history and decisions from other jurisdictions and determined there are no 
private actions under the UTPA.45  
CFM’s response to Ibsen’s reliance on the Montana cases of 
O’Fallon, Thomas and Williams is twofold: first, these cases deal with 
traditional common law tort claims when Ibsen has only pled statutory 
violations, and second, CFM asserts that Ibsen misinterpreted and 
overstated the holdings of the Montana cases, which are easily 
distinguished.46 CFM argues that O’Fallon dealt with claims handling, a 
clear exception under the UTPA to exclusive enforcement by the 
Auditor.47 The Court in O’Fallon allowed the action because it was 
unaddressed by the statute; Ibsen based its claims on statutory violations 
                                           
36 Id. at 11–12. 
37 Id. at 12–14 
38 Id. at 15. 
39 Faust v Util. Solutions, LLC, 173 P.3d 1183 (Mont. 2007). 
40 Id. at 1187. 
41 Caring for Montanan’s, Inc. Answer Brief, at 16–27. 
42 Shupak v. New York Life Ins. Co., 780 F. Supp. 1328 (D. Mont. 1991). 
43 Fossen v. Caring for Montanans, Inc., 993 F. Supp. 2d 1254 (D. Mont. 2014). 
44 Fossen v. Caring for Montanans, Inc., 617 F. App'x 737 (9th Cir. 2015). 
45 Caring for Montanan’s, Inc. Answer Brief at 30. 
46 Id. at 32. 
47 Id. at 33. 
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which were addressed by the Auditor.48 Thomas allowed an insured to file 
a common law action against an insurer, CFM distinguishes that Ibsen is 
not an insured.49 CFM argues Williams allowed for a bad faith claim, and 
not a violation of the statute itself.50 CFM concludes by stating that all of 
Ibsen’s claims are based on the statutory violations and none of them are 
based on a common law torts, and Ibsen’s attempt to convert them into 
common law torts through breach of contract is a “backdoor” method of 
getting around the exclusive enforcement of the Auditor.51  
CFM concludes that, though the trial court dismissed the claims 
on other grounds and did not reach this issue, the complaint should also be 
dismissed entirely on Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 
preemption because the claim deals with employee benefit plans.52 CFM 
also asserts that Health Care Service Corp. should be dismissed as a 
defendant.53  
 
C.   Appellee Health Care Service Corp 
 
The original defendant, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Montana, has 
since sold its private assets to Health Care Service Corp (HCSC), and its 
public assets were retained by CFM.54 HCSC filed a separate brief which 
makes many of the same arguments as CFM. Essentially, HSCS reiterates 
that the district court correctly concluded no claims can be brought under 
the UTPA outside claims handling or settlement practices.55 Allowing 
such claims would be contrary to the statute as written and the legislature’s 
intent that the Auditor be the sole enforcement mechanism of the 
UTPA.56   
 
D.   Amicus Curiae Montana State Auditor 
 
The State Auditor is charged with enforcement of Montana’s 
insurance code, including the UTPA.57 The Auditor disagrees with the 
district court and takes the position that insureds, third party claimants and 
other parties with an interest in an insurance contract can use the 
prohibited practices listed in the UTPA as the basis for a common law 
                                           
48 Id. at 34. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 35. 
51 Id. at 38. 
52 Id. at 38–44. 
53 Id. at 44–45. 
54 Id. at 13. 
55 Appellee Health Care Service Corp’s Answering Brief at 13–15, Ibsen v. Caring for Montanan’s 
Inc. (Mont. Oct. 26, 2015) (DA 15-0205). 
56 Id. 
57 MONT. CODE ANN. § 33–1–101 et seq. 
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claim.58 The Auditor argues that the legislature has never adopted the 
model amendments which make clear the UTPA does not create private 
actions.59 The Auditor alleges the federal courts ignored the plain language 
of the statutes and Montana precedent when they decided Fossen and 
Shupak.60 The Auditor also argues that the UTPA definitions should be 
available as support to traditional tort and contract claims, as “denying 
plaintiff’s access to the statutory definitions of unfair trade practices 
makes little sense.”61 The Auditor notes that allowing common law claims 
based on violations of the UTPA would not intrude upon the Auditor’s 
duties in enforcing the code.62 Finally, the Auditor argues that its 
enforcement powers are limited and that it cannot make a damaged party 
whole, leading to a need for private action for violations of the UTPA.63  
 
E.   Amicus Curiae Montana Trial Lawyers Association 
 
MTLA also disagrees with the district court. MTLA argues that 
there is a common law right to enforce provisions of the insurance code, 
and that the “private right of action” is a rule of decision for federal courts 
which have limited jurisdiction.64 It argues that state courts are courts of 
general jurisdiction, and can provide a remedy for any unlawful act.65 
MTLA argues for a common law right of action concurrent with regulation 
by the State Auditor to enforce the UTPA.66 
 
IV.   ANALYSIS 
 
The seminal issue in this case, whether there is a private right of 
action for violations UTPA, is important to Montana jurisprudence 
because it will determine whether the State Auditor is the sole enforcer of 
the UTPA, or if individuals affected by a statutory violation can bring suit 
and recover damages against an insurer. Further, it will decide an apparent 
split in federal and state courts. Finally, allowing individuals to bring suit 
for statutory violations of the UTPA has the potential to allow a large 
number of cases, including class actions, against insurance companies 
doing business in Montana. 
The Appellees appear to have the stronger argument that the 
statute was written to give the State Auditor the sole enforcement of the 
                                           
58 Amicus Curiae Brief of the Montana State Auditor at 2, Ibsen v. Caring for Montanan’s Inc. (Mont. 
Aug. 25, 2015) (DA 15-0205). 
59 Id. at 2–9. 
60 Id. at 9–14. 
61 Id. at 18. 
62 Id. at 18–19. 
63 Id. at 19–20. 
64 Montana Trial Lawyers Association Amicus Curiae Brief at 2, Ibsen v. Caring for Montanan’s Inc. 
(Mont. Aug. 26, 2015) (DA 15-0205). 
65 Id. at 6–7. 
66 Id. at 11. 
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UTPA outside of the claims process. Further, the persuasive authority of 
Shupak and Fossen are compelling. The Montana Supreme Court, 
however, has been expanding the rights of insureds little by little in 
O’Fallon, Thomas and Williams and could continue the trend in this 
decision. It is no surprise that MTLA supports an expansion of the 
available causes of action, but the State Auditor’s support, which dilutes 
their enforcement power, is compelling. The Court has several legal 
theories available to allow individual causes of action for violation of the 
UTPA. 
At oral argument, the Court will likely delve into the legislative 
history and the scope of the Montana cases, given the disagreement on 
these issues. We can likely expect to hear arguments about the weight to 
give the on-point federal decisions. Finally, the Court will ask questions 
about the statute and its construction, something that is missing analysis 
in all of the parties’ briefs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
